This NEW, mint, First Edition, HARDBACK, Helion & Co, UK, 2007, has glossy pictorial covers. The book size is 9" w x 12" h with a bibliography and 190 pristine pages on high quality paper. ISBN 1874622736. There are illustrations and maps. THE SECRET GOODWOOD MEETING. "Liddell Hart met with General Dempsey in a confidential meeting to clear up some of the misconceptions revolving around this operation. The response to Hart's list of questions was provided by General Dempsey on March 8th, 1951. These answers remained locked and the record file closed until at least the mid 1980s. Dempsey died in 1969. According to Dempsey, he thought the operation was highly successful, despite the lack of performance of 7th Armoured Division. The subsequent outcry from Eisenhower against Montgomery coupled with exaggerated press accounts given by Montgomery (which he stated was his mistake and he knew at the time it was wrong) were all to mislead the Germans and be entirely beneficial to the Allies. As far as Dempsey was concerned, as soon as the armoured advance had been halted at the end of the 18th, it was plain to see that an infantry battle remained. He lost interest and started to plan OPERATION BLUECOAT. Dempsey clearly states that GOODWOOD was Monty's plan and it never changed to breakout from the western flank. When the American operation on July 3rd had failed, General Bradley said he himself had failed. Monty went on to console the American and turned to Dempsey and said, "Go on hitting, drawing German strength, especially the armour, so as to ease the way for Brad". It was during a private meeting that Dempsey suggested to Monty, "I should make the breakout". To this, Monty said "no" and did not favour this idea. One of the key reasons why the Bourguebus plateau was the main target was that the Allies were in need of additional airfields and the airfield on the plateau had been a main objective since D-Day on June 6th. Dempsey went on to state that because of the reluctance of the Allied air forces to be used in specific battles for tactical reasons, Monty felt it was necessary to overstate the aims of the operation in order to get their cooperation and he did not let Eisenhower know. Dempsey was convinced that the Germans very well may collapse and in this light he had to be ready, which is why his HQ moved to the 8th Corps location. Dempsey said that any exploitation chance could only be ordered by him. This did not mean that this was the goal, only he had to be prepared for anything. Dempsey had a general plan to use should the front collapse. He had planned to seize all the crossings for the Orne from Caen to Argenta. The uttermost plan being to use his armour to shut down the crossing sites to the enemy. He had mapped out his plan. Dempsey claims that this "exploitation theme" was in his mind and never disclosed to anyone or any of his subordinates. Dempsey had planned to conduct the battle just as Monty intended. Because the air force had been misled intentionally, they were naturally furious when GOODWOOD ended where it did, and misunderstandings increased because of Monty's reticence to Eisenhower. This was a habit of Monty. … .." ( intro )
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