Britain's reputation in the Middle East was reduced to shreds by the Suez fiasco in 1956. Recovery was imminent--only to be shattered by the Six-Day War in 1967, a pivotal period in Israeli-Palestinian relations and in the history of the region and its contacts with the West. The ""Big Lie""--alleged British-American collusion with Israel--was a potent factor. "The Six-Day War and its Aftermath" is essentially an insider's account that refutes the ""Big Lie"" and traces British policy of strict impartiality and the pursuit ...
Britain's reputation in the Middle East was reduced to shreds by the Suez fiasco in 1956. Recovery was imminent--only to be shattered by the Six-Day War in 1967, a pivotal period in Israeli-Palestinian relations and in the history of the region and its contacts with the West. The ""Big Lie""--alleged British-American collusion with Israel--was a potent factor. "The Six-Day War and its Aftermath" is essentially an insider's account that refutes the ""Big Lie"" and traces British policy of strict impartiality and the pursuit of economic and political objectives in a turbulent region--vitally important to the West today.
New in new dust jacket. This mint, unread, First Edition, HARDBACK, I. B. Tauris, 2005, has a mint, unclipped dust jacket that is now protected in an extra, bespoke, clear, acid-free slipcover. The cover is dark green boards with gilt lettering to the spine. The book size is 5.6" x 9" h with notes, a bibliography, an index and 184 pristine pages on high quality paper. ISBN 1850434069. Nasser's Miscalculations &endash; President of Egypt. "Nasser prided himself on being a realist. He had warned Syria and Jordan that the Egyptian army, which he had re-armed with Soviet weaponry by 1967, would not be ready for war with Israel for well over a year. Moreover, about a third of it, and the best third at that, had been sent to the Yemen to fight for the republican side in the civil war against the royalist forces backed by Saudi Arabia. At the same time, he prided himself on being the supreme leader of the Arabs. It was true that the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria had broken down, with Syria resuming its independence, but the UAR title was still retained by Egypt for all official purposes. Nasser controlled in Cairo the most influential media resources in the region and called his main radio transmission Sawt ai-'Arab ('Voice of the Arabs'). It was listened to all over the Arab world. Nasser thus faced a dilemma in deciding how to react to Israeli reprisals against guerrilla attacks launched on Israel from Syria and Jordan. Both those countries looked to him for help, but he did not wish to be engaged yet in a war with Israel. Moreover, there was no obvious way in which he could even threaten Israel, since the Egyptian-Israeli border was occupied by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which had been created in 1956 to supervise Israeli withdrawal from Sinai after the conquest of that peninsula during the Suez campaign. Jordanian Radio struck a sensitive spot in Nasser's psychology when it accused him of 'hiding behind the skirts of UNEF'. Syria, under a Baathist regime since February 1966, had been encouraging Palestinian fida'iyin (commandos) to mount guerrilla raids on Israel, both from Syrian territory and from Jordan (against the will of Jordan's King Hussein). Israeli policy was to meet these raids with infrequent but severe reprisals against the states from which they had been mounted. One such attack against Syria took place in September 1966. Nasser, under criticism from Syria for failing to deter Israel, entered into an Egyptian-Syrian defence agreement on 4 December 1966. Politically that strengthened his standing in the Arab world, but, given Nasser's knowledge of the unreadiness of his armed forces, it was undoubtedly a miscalculation. It gave Egypt a commitment to help defend Syria with no corresponding control over Syrian policy. Shortly after this agreement was signed, Israel struck against Samu' in Jordan on 13 November in response to Palestinian guerrilla raids from Jordanian territory. The attack was mishandled and there was serious fighting with the Jordanian army. The Israelis were drawn into a heavier engagement than they had intended. In the course of it, they killed 14 Jordanian soldiers and six civilians, and destroyed 41 buildings. There was some shame for this in Israel, especially as the Israelis knew that it was Syria rather than Jordan that was responsible for the guerrilla action. Israel decided that their next reprisal must be against Syria and this occurred on 7 April 1967, when it launched an air attack, shooting down six Syrian MiG aircraft, two of them within sight of Damascus. Israeli politicians followed this up with public warnings to Syria, two of them from the prime minister and defence minister, Levi Eshkol. Arab opinion was particularly incensed by a reported warning from Yitzhak Rabin… .." ( Chapter 2 )
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