Description: Good. Good condition Cover surfaces and edges has rubbing, fading and discoloring. Small closed tears in back cover. Some browning and foxing on pages, page ends and edges. Content and text remains intact and in good shape. Content binding is secure. read more
Binding: Softcover
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Date Published: 1962
Description: Very Good. This paperback edition was printed in 1970. Covers lightly spotted, with price sticker residue at top right corner. Faint corner crease on rear cover. Spine is square and uncreased. Text is clean and bright. read more
Binding: Second
Publisher: Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA
Date Published: 1962
Description: good, fair to good. 25 cm, 426, maps, endpaper maps, footnotes, appendix, bibliography, index, some soiling to fore-edge, DJ worn, soiled, small tears/chips. Front DJ flap price clipped, old price sticker on front DJ flap. The author examines why America was suprised at Pearl Harbor. read more
Binding: Paperback
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Date Published: 1962
ISBN-13:9780804705981ISBN:0804705984
Description: Good. One sticker one front cover, two pages dog-eared, binding is tight, pages are crisp and clean, book is in good condition. Within 2 days. Satisfaction guaranteed! read more
Binding: Hardcover
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Date Published: 1962
Description: Acceptable in none jacket. Grey hardcover, 426 pages. Ex-library, soiled cover, edge wear, moisture marks and a little moisture damage but no interruption of any text-not dirty just very used and shelf wear. Being offered as READING COPY only since this is a very hard-to-find selection. read more
Binding: Paperback
Publisher: STANFORD UNIV PR
Date Published: 1962
ISBN-13:9780804705981ISBN:0804705984
Description: New. It would be reassuring to believe that Pearl Harbor was just a colossal and extraordinary blunder. What is disquieting is that it was a supremely ordinary blunder. In fact, 'blunder' is too specific; our stupendous unreadiness at Pearl Harbor was nei... read more
Binding: Softcover
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN-13:9780804705981ISBN:0804705984
Description: Good. 0804705984 Good condition. May have some markings & or shelfwear. All pages intact. Used items may not include extras such as infotrac, CD or other web access codes. read more
Binding: Hardcover
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Date Published: 1962-06-01
ISBN-13:9780804705974ISBN:0804705976
Description: Good. Good plus hardcover in good dust jacket, tape to edges of faded jacket, foxing to top edge, light discoloration to rear board, light odor, 1st. ed., Sumner Young's copy (name on title page) read more
Binding: Softcover
Publisher: Stanford University Press, Stanford
Date Published: 1967
Description: Softcover. Fair condition. The covers have slight tearing. "An exhaustively researched, beautifully executed work...It is the best book by far that has been published on the question of 'blame' for the disaster at Pearl Harbor"-Los Angeles Examiner. Includes an Index. read more
Binding: Hardcover
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Date Published: 1962-06-01
ISBN-13:9780804705974ISBN:0804705976
Description: Good. Excellent customer service. May ship from alternate location depending on your zip code and availability. Satisfaction guaranteed! ! read more
Binding: Trade Paperback
Publisher: Stanford Univ Pr, Stanford, CA
Date Published: 1962
ISBN-13:9780804705981ISBN:0804705984
Description: Near Fine. No Jacket-Wraps. 8vo-over 7¾"-9¾" tall. 426 p. An objective, carefully researched and competently written account of the critical evnts leading to Pearl Harbor as they appeared to intelligence people and the top officials of government. Clean. read more
"Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision is an extremely well-written historical snapshot that utilizes the available secondary sources on one of the most devastating attacks in U.S. history. Wohlstetter utilizes a remarkable amount of available sources to comprise a look back on the Pearl Harbor attack only twenty years after its occurrence. She concludes that the pieces available to those in positions to anticipate or deter an attack were too decentralized for any administrative body to make a coherent recommendation. Implicit in this argument is that Pearl Harbor prompted the wholesale restructuring of the U.S. intelligence services. She concludes that warnings of surprise attacks remain ambiguous and uncertain, and this reality is unlikely to change. Nevertheless, pursuing perfect information in intelligence is a goal worth striving for if American is to have any chance of correctly anticipating a surprise attack. Wohlestetter shows that many American politicians and military leaders understood that the possible repercussions of its oil embargo against the Japanese empire in 1941. Most of these leaders anticipated either an attack of sabotage on Oahu or a more likely surprise attack elsewhere in the Pacific, not at Pearl Harbor. Wohlstetter's also devotes much of her book to revealing the motivations for policies on both sides of the Pacific. Japan seemed unable to hold back on its territorial land and sea grab in the face of national honor. America, conversely, was unable to divert its attention away from the European theater long enough to consider an outright attack on Hawai'i. Finally, Wohlstetter shows Japanese estimates of American forces and explains the rationale for attacking the then dormant American military machine. Japan hopes that coordinated attacks throughout the Pacific would deter a full scale retaliation by American forces. Pearl Harbor was not the only notable surprise attack of 1941. That year Nazi forces invaded the Soviet Union. Blatantly defying a non-aggression pact, Hitler hoped that his surprise attack would give him an advantage over history-as in Napoleon's famed retreat from the Russian winter. This miscalculation decimated Napoleon's forces and marked the beginning of the end for the French emperor. Hitler's army would meet a similar fate despite the German dictator's obvious technical advantages. Comparisons between Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler's invasion are notable. Since both the United States and the U.S.S.R. would endure these military attacks and ultimately be victorious, historians should note similarities between these two invasions. The most obvious similarity comes from the ideas of Alfred Mahan, who noted with certainty that global hegemony could never be attained due to geographic realities. In short, distances can dictate military victors. Of course technology may shorten such distances, but to maintain a military presence over vast stretches of land or sea are difficult endeavors. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. had (and still enjoy) these distances which make any full scale invasion difficult. Scholars of the post-9/11 era should revisit Wohlstetter's book on America's (first) most devastating surprise attack. Of course, since the 1940s U.S. intelligence capabilities have increased considerably. Technology has aided in America's never-ending quest for better intelligence, and the consolidation and corporatization of the U.S. intelligence agencies improves effectiveness. The temporary backlash and wariness of the CIA in the 1970s has since given way to an even more bureaucratized Department of Homeland Security after 9/11. It seems that with every surprise attack the need for fluidity of information across departments increases. Pearl Harbor differs from America's intelligence challenges today. The United States currently battles not an empire, but an ideological foe, a scenario that arguably the Cold War has prepared America well. In short, contemporary readers can read Wohlstetter's book today and note that even with technological advances and managerial restructuring in the field of intelligence, it seems that when it comes to intelligence, the more things change the more things stay the same."
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