Providing a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications, this book is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the volume provides the most up-to-date analysis of traditional ...
Providing a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications, this book is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the volume provides the most up-to-date analysis of traditional theories of "optimal auctions" as well as newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. It explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. Paul Milgrom is the Leonard and Shirley Ely Professor of Humanities and Sciences and Professor of Economics, Stanford University. He is the author of more than sixty articles and co-author of the influential textbook, Economics, Organization and Management (Prentice Hall, 1992). Professor Milgrom is a pioneer in the economic theory of auctions and co-designer of the simultaneous, multiple round auction that the FCC adopted for selling radio spectrum licenses. Visit the author's website for instructor resources.
Some rubbing. VG. 23x15cm, xxii, 368 pp. Contents: Getting to work: Politics sets the stage; Designing for multiple goals; Comparing seller revenues; The academic critics; Plan for this book; Section I. The Mechanism Design Approach: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms: Formulation; Always optimal and weakly dominant strategies; Balancing the budget; Uniqueness; Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction; The envelope theorem and payoff equivalence: Hottelling's lemma; The envelope theorem in integral form; Quasi-linear payoffs; Bidding equilibrium and revenue differences: The single crossing conditions; Deriving and verifying equilibrium strategies; Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model; Expected-revenue maximizing auctions; Interdependence of types and values: Which models and assumptions are 'useful'? ; Statistical dependence and revenue-maximizing auctions; Wilson's drainage tract model; Correlated types model interdependent values; Auctions in context: The profit and surplus contribution of an entrant; Symmetric models with costly entry; Asymmetric models: devices to promote competition; After the bidding ends; Section II. Multi-Unit Auctions: Uniform price auctions: Uniform price sealed bid auctions; Simultaneous ascending auctions; Package auctions and combinatorial bidding: Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity problems; Bernheim-Whinston first-price package auctions; Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auctions; Conclusion.
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